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DIRECTORS' LIABILITY IN 
NEGLIGENCE – CHALLENGING THE 
"ELEMENTS OF THE TORT" APPROACH 
Victoria Stace* 
This article suggests that the "elements of the tort" approach to directors' liability in negligence to 
third parties should be discontinued on the basis that assumption of responsibility as a threshold 
test is not an element of the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement and a more constructive 
approach would be to address the policy issues associated with imposing liability on directors as 
part of the two-stage duty of care inquiry. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In a series of mostly High Court cases involving leaky buildings, the New Zealand courts have 
demonstrated an inconsistent and sometimes confused approach when determining what legal test to 
apply in a negligence action brought by a third party against a company director.  In 2009 the Court 
of Appeal removed some of the confusion by dismissing principles of attribution, limited liability 
and inconsistency with contractual relationships as the rationale for the Court's earlier decision in 
Trevor Ivory v Anderson,1 leaving it with the "elements of the tort" approach.2 This approach 
requires that an "assumption of responsibility" be found when that is an element of the relevant tort.  
Recent scholarship has found that assumption of responsibility, in the sense of being a threshold 
requirement before a non-director defendant is found to have a duty of care to a third party, is not an 
element of the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement. Why should the approach be any 
different if the defendant is a director? This paper argues that the correct approach in relation to an 
action in negligence or negligent misstatement against a company director, is to apply the two-stage 
proximity plus policy approach. Under this approach, which has been recently confirmed by the 
Supreme Court as the approach to take when determining whether to impose a duty of care in a 
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novel situation,3 the overall inquiry is whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care. 
There are two broad fields of inquiry. First the court asks, is the relationship between the alleged 
wrongdoer and the person who has suffered loss sufficiently proximate such that a duty of care 
arises? The court then asks, looking at the effects on society more broadly, and on the law, of 
imposing a duty, are there any policy considerations that count for or against the existence of a 
duty? Under this approach, any concerns about imposing liability on company directors can be 
addressed at the policy stage of that inquiry.  
II THE TESTS APPLIED IN THE LEAKY HOMES CASES TO 
ASSESS WHETHER DIRECTORS ARE LIABLE IN 
NEGLIGENCE 
In a situation where a construction company has gone out of existence (which is often the case 
in relation to companies that were involved in building leaky homes), the ultimate owners of the 
house (or apartment) faced with a large bill for remedial work might seek to recover against 
someone who they see as responsible for bad workmanship. Often this is a director of the defunct 
construction company. That person will commonly not have been personally involved in the 
building work. This presents issues for the courts, because the negligence claim has to attach to 
something the director did or said. The director is a separate legal person from the company. While 
the company can be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employees and agents, the director 
cannot. The tests the New Zealand courts have applied to assess whether the director's involvement 
was such that he or she should be held responsible in negligence are the "assumption of 
responsibility" and the "degree of control" tests.  
However these tests are very different. The assumption of responsibility test, from Trevor Ivory 
and Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd,4 is a threshold test which must be met before a duty 
of care arises. It requires a close examination of what the director did or said, in order to ascertain 
(objectively) whether the director can be said to have assumed a legal responsibility towards the 
plaintiff, almost like a contractual undertaking but with no consideration. The degree of control test, 
by contrast, is a way of establishing proximity, particularly where a director did not have a hands-on 
role in the building of the defective structure. It is part of the two-stage duty of care inquiry, and 
focuses on the degree of control the director had over building operations. 
III ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY IS NOT AN ELEMENT 
OF THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE 
Recent scholarship has argued that assumption of responsibility is not an element of either the 
tort of negligence or negligent misstatement, in the sense that it must be established before a duty 
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will arise. Rather, to the extent that it is part of the duty of care inquiry, assumption of responsibility 
is what the court will impose once it finds a relationship of proximity. The arguments made by these 
writers are compelling, particularly that the law of negligence is a unified whole and negligent 
misstatement should not be treated as a special case requiring a voluntary assumption of 
responsibility.  
In a recent essay, Robertson and Wang conclude that, in relation to liability in negligence for 
economic loss, including (but not limited to) negligent misstatement, assumption of responsibility is 
not "a distinct category of obligation, but a loosely defined subset of proximity".5 This conclusion is 
supported by other writers and is consistent with the New Zealand Court of Appeal decisions in 
Attorney-General v Carter (Carter), and Rolls Royce New Zealand Ltd v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd 
(Rolls Royce).6  
Robertson and Wang review Hedley Byrne v Heller and find their Lordships ambivalent on the 
issue of whether assumption of responsibility is a voluntarily assumed obligation or a manifestation 
of the neighbourhood principle, in other words, an obligation imposed by law.7 Lord Devlin's 
speech gives the most support for the former analysis. Supporters of this approach ("rights based" 
proponents) argue that we do not have inherent rights to protection from economic loss, so the right 
of action must stem from a quasi-contractual undertaking by the defendant. Whether the defendant 
has undertaken such responsibility is to be assessed objectively.  
Robertson and Wang point out numerous problems with this approach. In particular, it is 
inconsistent with Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc, where the House of 
Lords made it clear that the proper inquiry was whether proximity was established.8 Williams, 
which provides strong support for the rights based proponents, has been criticised and is inconsistent 
with other cases such as Smith v Eric S Bush.9 Robertson and Wang conclude that:10  
… what characterises the assumption of responsibility cases is simply that the defendant has accepted a 
role, or embarked on a task, in which the claimant is so closely and directly affected by the defendant 's 
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acts and omissions that the defendant ought to have the claimant in contemplation when considering 
whether and how to act.  
Witting describes the use of assumption of responsibility in Williams as "a mere device for the 
protection of small company directors and to reinforce rules of separate legal personality".11 He 
argues that assumption of responsibility as an independent test for duty is contrary to both its usage 
in Hedley Byrne and the observations in Barclays Bank. His approach is that the law of negligence 
is a unified whole and a common set of elements (in particular proximity) can be employed 
regardless of the type of negligence involved. Because financial interests are not highly valued by 
comparison to other interests in tort law, policy plays a big part in determining liability, particularly 
in relation to misstatement cases. 
Witting acknowledges the rights based proponents' arguments, that claims for loss resulting 
from negligent misstatements should only be allowed where there is a right that has been violated, 
and that the only possible "right" is one arising from an undertaking made by the defendant. 
However this would make the law of negligent misstatement different from all other negligence law. 
No support for that can be found in Hedley Byrne. In Smith, the House of Lords demonstrated that, 
at the end of the day, liability in tort is imposed, not assumed. In Barclays Bank the House of Lords 
confirmed that assumption of responsibility is a type of proximity found within the Caparo three-
fold test for a duty of care (foreseeability, proximity and policy).12 The real issue, says Witting, is 
the attitude of the law towards these issues. 
Barker also acknowledges the opposing views of the rights based proponents on the one hand 
and, on the other, those who believe that the duty of care issue in cases involving economic loss is 
no different from that in other types of negligence cases.13 The latter argue that words are simply a 
form of conduct and duties of care arise from the basic premise that we ought to take reasonable 
care to avoid harming the interests of others who may foreseeably and directly be affected by what 
we do or say. The special relationship in Hedley Byrne is seen as one instance of the proximity that 
gives rise to duties. Duties of care in relation to economic loss are, on this view, "progressive, 
incremental extensions of an existing, welfarist tradition in tort law" and reflect "the rising 
importance of pure economic interests in the modern world".14  
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Assuming then that we come down on the side of the scholarship that rejects the need to base 
liability for economic loss on a voluntarily assumed obligation, should the law be different if the 
defendant is a company director? Is there any justification for the protectionist approach referred to 
by Witting? This article suggests no. 
IV THE LEAKY HOMES DECISIONS 
In the context of leaky homes litigation, the courts have demonstrated an inconsistent approach 
to the issue of when a director will be found to owe a duty of care to a third party. Sometimes the 
test applied is whether the director personally assumed responsibility. Sometimes the test is whether 
the director had a sufficient degree of control over building operations such that proximity is 
established. Sometimes both tests are applied.  
The degree of control test is from the 1984 High Court decision of Morton v Douglas Homes 
Ltd. Hardie Boys J, drawing on earlier authority, found that the degree of control that a director had 
over the operations of the company provided a test of whether or not his or her personal carelessness 
would be likely to cause damage to a third party, so that he or she became subject to a duty of 
care.15 
In Body Corporate 202254 v Taylor the Court of Appeal attempted to clarify the correct 
approach to directors' liability in negligence, leaving us with the elements of the tort approach. In 
doing so, it has singled out negligent misstatement as a branch of negligence requiring special 
treatment, at least where the defendant is a company director.16 This is inconsistent with the 
scholarship discussed above. 
Confusion has also arisen from the courts' lack of clarity on the meaning of assumption of 
responsibility. Sometimes assumption of responsibility is required, but it is not made clear whether 
this is treated as a threshold test or part of the two-stage proximity plus policy inquiry. On occasion 
the court says assumption of responsibility is required, but the inquiry then focuses on the degree of 
control the defendant had over operations rather than whether they can be said to have taken on a 
voluntary obligation. 
There is also confusion over the difference between the assumption of responsibility test and the 
degree of control test. The assumption of responsibility test (from Trevor Ivory and Williams), and 
the degree of control test (from Morton) are fundamentally different. As explained above, the 
former is a threshold test, which must be met before a duty of care will arise. It involves looking at 
what the director said and did, in an attempt to find, objectively, whether he or she can be said to 
have taken on a personal obligation of liability to the plaintiff. The latter is part of the proximity 
test. It involves looking at the director's role, so that even if the defective work was in fact carried 
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out by (for example) subcontractors, if there is evidence of personal control or instruction, the 
director might be liable for failure to exercise care in his or her role as controller.  
With these parameters in mind, the next section turns to look at the leaky homes decisions in 
more detail.17 
V HIGH COURT CASES PRE-TAYLOR 
In Drillien v Tubberty in 2005, Associate Judge Faire considered that personal assumption of 
responsibility in the Trevor Ivory sense was required whenever an action was brought against a 
director in negligence (including for defective buildings). However he then went on to consider 
whether there was the necessary proximity to establish a duty of care, and found that the director 
was not involved in the areas of defective workmanship nor directly responsible for them, in effect 
applying the degree of control test to the proximity inquiry.18 
In Dicks v Hobson Swan Construction in 2006, Baragwanath J recognised the competing policy 
considerations then stated that the "advice cases are distinctive as turning on the specific identity of 
the (legal) person on whom reliance is placed and thus the limited scope of the duty assumed under 
the relatively new tort of negligent misstatement".19 He eventually decided to follow Morton, even 
though, as he acknowledged, it conflicted with Trevor Ivory because it could be read as meaning the 
court will impute an assumption of responsibility.  
In Hartley v Balemi in 2007, Stevens J said the starting point was the two-stage test for a duty of 
care from Rolls Royce. He described Trevor Ivory as the "leading case" on directors' liability and 
stated that an assumption of responsibility is required in order to create personal liability.20 He 
acknowledged that Trevor Ivory involved negligent misstatement, which was not the case here. 
After referring to the degree of control test from Morton, he said that the effect that Trevor Ivory has 
had on that test is "somewhat unclear".21 He decided that in the context of leaky homes, it was 
appropriate for decisions makers to apply, where appropriate, the degree of control test. 
In Body Corporate 188273 v Leuschke in 2007, counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the director 
assumed personal responsibility (in a Trevor Ivory sense) to the owners by virtue of his total control 
of the project (based on Morton), in effect combining the two tests. Harrison J stated that:22 
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… an individual who commits all the elements of a tort … will be held directly liable for the 
consequences, whether solely or concurrently with his principal according to the rule of attribution and 
irrespective of whether or not he was acting as a director or pursuant to any other agency. The status of 
director does not carry any special immunities from personal liability.  
Where the tort of negligent misstatement is alleged (said his Honour), an assumption of 
responsibility is one of its critical elements. By contrast, in cases of general negligence, the 
existence of a duty is determined by a two-stage inquiry, focusing first on proximity and then 
expanding into a wider policy analysis. However, he then stated that the element of assumption of 
personal responsibility is:23  
… central to the proximity inquiry … That concept has been expressly identified as the appropriate test 
for determining a director's personal liability; and is often satisfied "where the director or employee 
exercises particular control or control over a particular operation or activity". 
VI BODY CORPORATE 202254 v TAYLOR 
In Taylor, the Court of Appeal, after considering the previous decisions in Trevor Ivory and 
Williams, dismissed principles of attribution, limited liability and inconsistency with contractual 
relationships as the rationale for the approach taken in those decisions, leaving it with the ‘elements 
of the tort’ approach. This was the approach primarily adopted by McGechan J in Trevor Ivory. 
William Young P in Taylor stated:24 
In a situation where assumption of responsibility is an element of the tortious liability, an employee who is 
acting on behalf of a principal can only be liable if there is a personal assumption of responsibility by that 
employee. 
Taylor involved a claim in negligence against a company director, alleging he was negligent in 
his conduct and management of a property development where the property developed leaky 
building syndrome within two years of completion. As it was a strike out application, the court had 
only limited facts before it but it appears Mr Taylor, while not directly involved in the construction, 
may have been in a position of control over operations. 
A complicating factor was that a brochure had been produced by the real estate agent which 
promoted Mr Taylor as a person with over 25 years' experience, represented that there would be a 
high level of workmanship, and described the external cladding in a potentially misleading way. The 
court said Mr Taylor was "ultimately responsible" for the material that appeared in the brochure and 
  
23  At [55]. 
24  Body Corporate 202254 v Taylor, above n 2, at [33]. 
492 (2016) 47 VUWLR 
most likely approved its contents.25 His actions might then have founded an action in negligent 
misstatement, but the court proceeded on the basis that it was a general negligence claim. 
Having found that the elements of the tort approach was the right one, William Young P then 
proceeded to inquire whether Mr Taylor had assumed a personal responsibility to the eventual 
purchasers of the property. He considered it necessary to find personal assumption of responsibility 
before a duty of care arose. The fact that the director, Mr Taylor, did not appear to have done more 
than was "commonplace in the way in which small companies operate" counted against finding an 
assumption of responsibility.26 In effect he regarded assumption of responsibility as an element of 
the tort in this case.27 In his minority judgment, Chambers J expressed the view that assumption of 
responsibility was only an element of the tort if the claim was in negligent misstatement (because 
negligence by words required special rules), and that it was therefore not required here.28 
One might wonder why the majority proceeded to inquire into whether there had been an 
assumption of responsibility, given that the claim was made in general negligence.29 The High 
Court recently offered an explanation: the majority in Taylor was applying the control test from 
Morton as it "involved similar considerations".30 Another reason may be that the majority regarded 
assumption of responsibility as an element of the tort of negligence in cases involving economic 
loss.31 Or possibly the Court was influenced by the fact that the director was "ultimately 
responsible" for the statements in the brochure. In any event, based on the majority decision, we are 
left with a situation where assumption of responsibility is generally regarded as an element of the 
tort of negligent misstatement, and certainly when the defendant is a company director.  
VII HIGH COURT CASES POST-TAYLOR 
In Chee v Stareast Investment Ltd in 2009, Wylie J, when referring to the previous cases, said 
"[s]ome of these decisions are not altogether easy to reconcile" and "finding a consistent and 
principled approach has proved difficult".32 Here the Tribunal below had referred to both the 
  
25  At [65]. 
26  At [43]. 
27  The Court adopted the expression "elements of the tort" from an article in NZ Lawyer which asserted that 
assumption of liability is an element of the tort of negligent misstatement: see Lewis Turner "Searching for 
a principled approach – directors' personal liability in tort" [2006] 49 NZ Lawyer 14. 
28  Body Corporate 202254 v Taylor, above n 2, at [144]. 
29  See Stephen Todd and Others The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th ed, Brookers, Wellington 2013) at 
383–384. 
30  Barron v Hutton [2012] NZHC 2183 at [28].  
31  Hedley Byrne can be read as applying to economic loss cases generally and not as being restricted to 
negligent misstatement. 
32  Chee v Stareast Investment Ltd HC AK CIV 2009-404-005255 1 April 2010 at [91]. 
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assumption of responsibility test and the degree of control test, but was found to have applied 
incorrect principles of law. Referring to the recently decided Taylor case, Wylie J said:33 
An elements of the tort approach requires as a pre-condition for liability a conclusion that the director 
assumed personal responsibility for the relevant conduct associated with a presumption against such an 
assumption where the director was simply acting on behalf of the company …  
Because assumption of responsibility was not regarded as an element of the tort of negligence, all 
that was required here was the establishment of a legal duty of care. The Tribunal:34 
… should have asked itself whether the director assumed personal liability for the relevant conduct. The 
"degree of control" test articulated by Hardie Boys J in Morton is likely to be of considerable help in 
answering that question. 
In Lockie v North Shore City Council in 2011, actions were brought in negligence and negligent 
misstatement against an employee of a consulting engineering firm.35 The employee had performed 
a pre-purchase inspection and signed the report which said there were no structural deficiencies in 
the house. This was not a case against a director but an employee. The action in negligence was 
struck out leaving the action in negligent misstatement. Morton, Trevor Ivory, Dicks and Leuschke 
were all referred to by counsel. Associate Judge Faire found that because this was a negligent advice 
case, for liability to attach "there must be an assumption of responsibility, whether actual or 
imputed".36 Because he was carrying out work for the company, no personal commitment was 
found to have been undertaken.  
In Body Corporate 314950 v James Hardie in 2013, the sole director of a liquidated developer 
was sued by the subsequent purchasers of a leaky apartment development.37 It was claimed the 
director was liable in negligence because he was the ultimate controller of the project, or he had 
personally performed certain building acts, or he had inadequately supervised employees, or had 
failed to have proper control of construction. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued, based on Morton, 
that the director could be liable if he had personal control over the building operations, and also that 
he could be liable if he had assumed a duty of care "actual or imputed" based on Trevor Ivory, 
depending on the facts and policy considerations.38 Associate Judge Christiansen referred to three 
earlier cases which were decided either on the basis of assumption of personal liability or 
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38  At [9]. 
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responsibility for supervision, and proceeded on the basis that the ultimate inquiry was the degree to 
which the director had been personally involved in the building operation. 
In Derwin v Wellington City Council in 2014, an action was brought against the Wellington City 
Council in negligence for issuing a code compliance certificate (CCC) where there were no 
reasonable grounds for believing the building work complied with the building code.39 The 
Wellington City Council claimed against Mr Derwin, the managing director of the building 
company that had constructed the house, on the basis that Mr Derwin had made negligent 
representations in relation to the issuing of the CCC. The Court found there was no general rule 
shielding a person who acts on behalf of a company from liability for the person's wrong doing. 
After considering Trevor Ivory, Williams and Taylor, the Court found that the test for liability was 
whether the director had (objectively) assumed personal responsibility, either to the Council or to 
the eventual purchasers. There was no personal assumption of responsibility here because Mr 
Derwin was not directly involved in the building, or the plans, or the supervision, and was never on 
the building site. In other words, because he had no control over operations.40  
VIII STEPHENS v BARRON 
The issue of directors' liability in negligence recently came before the Court of Appeal in 
another context. Stephens v Barron was a summary judgement application in relation to a 
negligence claim against a company director for failing to use reasonable care and skill in relation to 
the supervision, instruction and training of an employee who negligently conducted a pest-control 
spraying operation causing significant damage and economic loss.41 The director (and another 
senior employee also facing allegations of negligence) did not personally take part in the spraying 
operation. The Court of Appeal refused to grant the summary judgement, in effect saying it was not 
satisfied, on the limited evidence before it, that none of the claims could succeed.  
In the High Court, Doogue J had reviewed Morton, Trevor Ivory and Taylor and concluded that 
assumption of responsibility is not an element of the tort of negligence (as opposed to negligent 
misstatement).42 His Honour adopted the degree of control test from Morton, which he recognised 
as a way of establishing proximity but not a precondition to finding a duty of care. 
In the Court of Appeal, arguments that judgment should be given for the defendants because 
imposition of a duty would be an attack on limited liability, or inconsistent with the contractual 
  
39  Derwin v Wellington City Council [2014] NZHC 341. The judgment was overturned on appeal in part but 
the Court of Appeal did not consider the negligence cause of action: Wellington City Council v Dallas 
[2014] NZCA 631 at [3]. 
40  At [97]. 
41  Stephens v Barron [2014] NZCA 82, (2014) 21 PRNZ 734. 
42  Barron v Hutton, above n 30. 
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framework, failed. No specific mention was made of the need to establish a personal assumption of 
responsibility, either by the director or the senior employee. O'Regan P, giving the decision for the 
Court, said:43 
If any duty is established, it would be a duty arising from the personal actions of Mr and Mrs Stephens, 
not from their position as directors of ACSD. It would not make any difference whether the business 
they were directing, or for which they were working, was conducted through a limited liability entity or 
otherwise, what would matter would be their role in the business and the personal action said to give rise 
to a duty. 
This statement can be read as consistent with the application of the degree of control test. 
IX THE APPROACH OF THE ENGLISH COURTS 
The English courts commonly require an assumption of responsibility when an action in 
negligence or negligent misstatement is brought against a company director. Sainsbury's 
Supermarkets Ltd v Condek Holdings Ltd is a recent example.44 In Sainsbury's Supermarkets, 
Sainsbury's brought an action in negligence for the design and construction of a car park against 
both the inventor of the carpark system and the company that he operated his business through. 
Drawing on Williams for the applicable law, the court found that the assumption of responsibility 
principle from Hedley Byrne is not limited to statements but extends to the provision of services. In 
a case where:45 
… a trader incorporates a company to which he transfers his business, personal liability under the 
extended Hedley Byrne principle will not be established in the absence of a special relationship between 
the erstwhile trader who is alleged to be a tortfeasor in his personal capacity and the Claimant. In other 
words, there must have been an assumption of responsibility such as to create a special relationship 
between the Claimant and the director or employee himself.  
Stuart-Smith J said as the test is objective, the focus must be on what was said and done by the 
defendant, and there will be no special relationship or assumption of responsibility "if the director 
does no more than act in a way that is consistent with his position as director".46 Mere routine 
involvement does not justify a belief that the director accepted a personal commitment, as opposed 
to a known company obligation. There was no need to inquire as to whether it was fair, just and 
reasonable to impose a duty, as the case never got over the threshold test of assumption of 
responsibility. 
  
43  Stephens v Barron, above n 41, at [30]. Only one was a director at the relevant time. 
44  Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v Condek Holdings Ltd [2014] EWHC 2016 (TCC). 
45  At [17]. See also Robinson v PE Jones [2011] EWCA Civ 9. 
46  Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v Condek Holdings Ltd, above n 44, at [18]. 
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This article suggests that the New Zealand courts should not adopt this approach. Requiring an 
assumption of responsibility as a threshold test masks the issue of whether there are policy reasons 
why company directors should be shielded in whole or in part from liability in negligence. In 
addition, requiring a finding that the director stepped out of their role as director and acted on their 
own account will make it very difficult to establish liability, as the defendant director will almost 
always have acted on behalf of the company. The result can also turn on finding that the director did 
certain acts that were potentially inadvertent (such as using personal stationery rather than company 
letterhead).  
X THE APPROACH TO THE DUTY OF CARE ISSUE IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
In relation to non-director defendant cases, the New Zealand courts have adopted a two-stage 
test for when a duty of care will be found to arise in a novel situation. The test is broadly based on 
the Anns formulation, but the questions to be asked at each stage of the inquiry have been 
reformulated. The first stage focuses on the relationship between the parties and the second involves 
broader considerations of policy or principle that count for or against finding a duty. 
In 2004 the Court of Appeal in Rolls Royce summarised the relevant test for finding a duty of 
care in a novel situation in the following terms, citing South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New 
Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd, and Carter as authority:47 
The ultimate question when deciding whether a duty of care should be recognised in New Zealand is 
whether, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, it is just and reasonable that such a duty be 
imposed. The focus is on two broad fields of inquiry but these provide only a framework rather than a 
straightjacket. The first area of inquiry is as to the degree of proximity or relationship between the 
parties. The second is whether there are other wider policy considerations that tend to negative or restrict 
or strengthen the existence of a duty in the particular class of case. At this second stage, the court's 
inquiry is concerned with the effect of the recognition of a duty on other legal duties and, more 
generally, on society. 
In Carter the Court of Appeal discussed the correct approach in cases of negligent misstatement 
(as opposed to general negligence) and considered whether there was some extra element of the test 
in the case of an allegation of negligent misstatement such as "the existence of some special skill 
and its application for the assistance of the plaintiff before one gets to the questions of assumption 
of responsibility and reliance".48 The Court found that there was no additional requirement. 
Assumption of responsibility was part of the proximity inquiry, the ultimate inquiry is whether it is 
  
47  Rolls-Royce, above n 6; South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & 
Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282 (CA); and Attorney-General v Carter, above n 6. See also Carter 
Holt Harvey Ltd v Minister of Education, above n 3, at [14]. 
48  Attorney-General v Carter, above n 6, at [29]. 
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fair, just and reasonable to require the defendant to take reasonable care to avoid causing the 
plaintiff loss or damage of the kind for which compensation is being sought and there was no 
materially different approach in a negligent misstatement case.49 The Court said:50 
Each case will have its own particular combination of circumstances against which the necessary 
judgment must be made. To assist in answering the ultimate question, a two stage approach, under the 
headings of proximity and policy, has been found helpful and is now firmly established in our law. 
In cases of negligent mis-statement, as we have seen, the concepts of assumption of responsibility and 
foreseeable and reasonable reliance have been adopted to assist in reaching a principled and reasonably 
predictable answer to the proximity inquiry. 
The High Court recently adopted the Rolls Royce two-stage test, in Houghton v Saunders, a case 
involving an allegation of negligent misstatement against company directors.51 No part of Dobson 
J's decision focused on the need to find an assumption of responsibility. 
XI ATTACHING LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT ACTIONS OR 
WORDS TO A COMPANY DIRECTOR  
The New Zealand courts should reject assumption of responsibility as a threshold requirement in 
an action in negligence or negligent misstatement against a company director. To require an 
assumption of responsibility is inconsistent with recent scholarship which argues that assumption of 
responsibility is not an element of the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement. Assumption of 
responsibility as a threshold requirement for establishing liability in negligence or negligent 
misstatement against a director is also inconsistent with the Court of Appeal's recent decision in 
Stephens. The correct approach is to apply the two-stage proximity plus policy test from Rolls 
Royce. 
Whether the proximity part of the two-stage test will be satisfied is a mixed question of fact and 
law and will require careful inquiry into the circumstances of the particular case. The proximity 
stage of the inquiry would focus in particular on the nature of the relationship between the defendant 
director and the claimant. Here the court will consider such matters as: whether there was a 
contractual relationship showing that the parties had allocated risk in some other way; whether the 
loss was foreseeable; whether there was reliance (in the case of a misstatement) and whether 
reliance was foreseeable and reasonable; whether there was any relevant statutory context; whether 
the claimant was vulnerable such that the law should be involved in providing protection; and 
whether there is any degree of analogy with previously decided cases. The director's degree of 
  
49  At [30]. 
50  At [30]–[31]. 
51  Houghton v Saunders [2014] NZHC 2229, [2015] 2 NZLR 74 at [672]. 
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involvement in the negligent act will be important. If the director said the offending words, or did 
the offending act then it will be easier to establish proximity.  
If the director has not performed the offending act or said the offending words, but is one step 
removed from the person who did so, then it is still possible to find that the director owed a duty of 
care to the plaintiff. Liability would have to be based on the director's personal actions or 
involvement and is separate from any liability that attaches to the company vicariously. Again the 
two-stage proximity plus policy test should be applied. The degree of control test from Morton may 
be of assistance in establishing proximity.52 However even in this situation there should be no 
threshold requirement that assumption of responsibility must be found. Any concerns that the court 
has about imposing liability on a company director (by reason of being a company director) can be 
addressed as part of the policy stage of the duty of care inquiry. 
XII THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DUTY OF CARE 
ASSESSMENT 
The courts' approach has been to proceed with caution when considering whether to impose 
liability for negligence on a director. What this sense of caution stems from is unclear. The decision 
in Taylor suggests the basis may be "the idea that a corporation has a legal identity which is separate 
from those of the individuals involved in it".53 This article proposes that concerns about imposing 
liability on directors should be addressed as part of the two-stage duty of care inquiry. At the policy 
stage of the inquiry the court can consider these issues directly. There has been significant academic 
debate about whether company directors should receive special protection from tort liability because 
of their status as a company director. This article argues that the policy considerations in favour of 
imposing a duty are compelling.  
The law should aim to deter directors from engaging in actions (including negligently) that 
might be detrimental not only to third parties but also to the company or its shareholders.54 
"Deterrence and distribution of loss require that an individual bears responsibility for civil wrongs 
committed by him or her. A company director is no exception."55 If the company is the only party 
  
52  Another way of attaching liability to a director who did not perform the wrongful act is if it can be shown 
that the director "directed or procured" the company to commit the tort. If this route to liability is used the 
director becomes a secondary tortfeasor and the inquiry focuses on whether he or she directed or induced 
the commission of the tort. Liability stems from Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano Co 
[1921] 2 AC 465 (HL) at 476. See also Wah Tat Bank [1975] AC 507 (PC) at 514–515; and MCA Records v 
Charly Records [2001] EWCA Civ 1441, [2002] BCC 650. 
53  Body Corporate 202254 v Taylor, above n 2, at [33]. 
54  Helen Anderson "Piercing the Veil on Corporate Groups in Australia: The Case for Reform" (2009) 33 
Melb U L Rev 333 at 344; and Stefan HC Lo "Liability of Directors as Joint Tortfeasors" (2009) JBL 109 at 
123. 
55  Giora Shapira "Liability of Corporate Agents: Williams v Natural Life Ltd in the House of Lords" (1999) 20 
Co Law 130 at 134.  
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liable to a tort victim, that could encourage corporate controllers to engage in excessively risky 
activities through undercapitalised companies, or to reduce professional standards.56 The application 
of tort rules to company directors is a way to ameliorate abuse of the company form by small 
businesses.57 
If directors are (effectively) shielded from liability in tort, that creates an unfair distinction as 
regards liability of employees.58 Employees are under current law personally responsible for 
wrongdoing, so directors (who are also often employees, at least in closely-held companies) should 
be liable as well. There are some who argue that employees (including directors) in general should 
not bear responsibility for their wrongdoings.59 That is another debate and should be addressed 
head-on rather than obliquely by requiring an assumption of responsibility for some employees, 
namely directors. 
Parliament has shown its intention to make directors liable for their negligent wrongdoings in 
various legislation, such as the recent Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (and previous securities 
legislation). Flanagan attributes the "more or less continuous increase in the range and scope of 
statutory liability for directors" to the recognition that risk-taking should be disciplined by 
responsibility for its adverse consequences.60 More generally it indicates recognition of a broader 
public interest in holding directors liable for their negligence, at least in certain contexts.61 
However, unless there is first established a sound reason for excluding directors from the ambit of 
common law negligence liability, issues of directors' liability should not be left exclusively to statute 
law. 
Some commentators argue that company law requires modification of the normal consequences 
of wrongdoing (except where there is fraud).62 These commentators argue that personal liability of 
directors is constrained by the doctrines of company law. Directors are protected, the argument 
  
56  Lo, above n 54, at 110; Shapira, above n 55, at 138; and Stephen Todd "Assuming Responsibility for Torts" 
(2003) 119 LQR 199 at 203. 
57  Christian Witting "The Small Company: Directors' Status and Liability in Negligence" (2013) 24 KLJ 343 
at 364. 
58  Todd, above n 56, at 202; and Witting, above n 57, at 355. 
59  See for example Michael Sharp "Who Assumes Responsibility for Negligent Acts of Employees?" (2012) 
18 NZBLQ 3. 
60  Robert Flannigan "The Personal Tort Liability of Directors" (2002) 81 Can Bar Rev 247 at 262. 
61  Anderson, above n 54, at 345. 
62  See in particular Ross Grantham "Company Director's Personal Liability in Tort" (2003) 62 CLJ 15; Ross 
Grantham and Charles Rickett "Directors' 'Tortious' Liability: Contract, Tort of Company Law?" (1999) 62 
MLR 133; and Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett "Company Directors' Liability for Torts" [2003] NZLJ 
155. 
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goes, for two reasons: separate corporate personality and, in cases involving economic loss, the need 
for a quasi-contract. However it can also be argued that it would be a subversion of the separate 
corporate personality principle not to apply the ordinary tort rules. Both the company and its 
directors are capable of committing torts and of being held accountable for them, because they are 
separate legal persons.63 Further, as the leaky homes cases demonstrate, failure to recognise a 
general duty in negligence can leave a potential gap in liability coverage. This gap is particularly 
evident in the case of a tort committed by a company which declines into insolvency, leaving the 
victim with no one worth suing.64 
Concerns about the breadth of liability in particular for negligent statements can be met in other 
ways, for example requiring causation. In order to found the commission of the tort, there must be a 
causal relationship between the error in the statement and subsequent injury to the claimant. At a 
minimum, the claimant must have heard or read the statement in question and acted upon it to his or 
her detriment.65 Finally, often voiced concerns that "competent individuals will refuse to serve as 
directors" are not supported by sound empirical evidence.66  
XIII CONCLUSION 
Determining the liability in tort of an individual who is a director of a company is a "complex 
issue",67 particularly in closely held companies where one person may at different times act in many 
capacities and have several legal relationships with a company. The Federal Court of Canada said in 
Mentmore Manufacturing:68  
On the one hand, there is the principle that an incorporated company is separate and distinct in law from 
its shareholders, directors and officers, and it is in the interests of the commercial purposes served by the 
incorporated enterprise that they should as a general rule enjoy the benefit of limited liability afforded 
by incorporation. On the other hand, there is the principle that everyone should be answerable for his 
tortious acts. 
This article has argued that to cloak discussion of the issues by requiring an assumption of 
responsibility before a duty of care arises is not helpful. It is inconsistent with judicial authority and 
unsupported by recent scholarship. A more useful approach is to address policy issues directly as 
part of the two-stage duty of care inquiry. As part of policy considerations, the courts can directly 
  
63  Witting, above n 57, at 364. 
64  At 365. 
65  At 367. Reliance in fact must be established as well as that reliance was reasonable in the circumstances. 
66  Flannigan, above n 60, at 313–317. 
67  Susan Watson "Liability of Individuals for Torts of the Company" [2007] NZLJ 27. 
68  Mentmore Manufacturing Co v National Merchandise Manufacturing Co (1978) 40 CPR (2d) 164 (FCC) at 
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address the issue: is the fact that the defendant is a director relevant in the sense that it counts 
against imposition of the duty of care, and if so why?  
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